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T HIS Article details the major state and federal developments in the
area of criminal pretrial procedure during the Survey period.
I. SPEEDY TRIAL
The most notable development in pretrial criminal procedure this Survey
period was the demise of the Texas Speedy Trial Act.' A sharply divided
court of criminal appeals 2 held the Speedy Trial Act unconstitutional be-
cause it violates the separation of powers doctrine in the Texas
Constitution.3
The Texas Constitution divides the powers of government into three de-
partments.4 A power that has been granted in the constitution to one branch
of the government may not be exercised by another branch.5 Article V of
the Texas Constitution6 creates the office of prosecuting attorney. The same
article also establishes the judicial branch of government. 7 Thus, the court
of criminal appeals reasoned, prosecuting attorneys are members of the judi-
cial branch of government and entitled to the separation of powers protec-
tion as expressed in article II, section 1 of the Texas Constitution.8
County and district attorneys function primarily to represent the state in
criminal cases. 9 In carrying out this function, a prosecutor must be free to
exercise discretion in preparing cases for trial. '0 The separation of powers
doctrine prevents the legislature from abridging this discretion unless au-
thorized by an express constitutional provision. I
The legislature, however, may provide procedural guidelines regulating
the method of asserting a defendant's substantive rights.12 By enacting the
Speedy Trial Act, the legislature attempted to regulate enforcement of a de-
*B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988).
2. Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
3. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
4. Id
5. 739 S.W.2d at 252.
6. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 21.
7. Id. art. V, § 1 (1891, amended 1980).
8. 739 S.W.2d at 253.
9. Id. at 254.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 254-55.
12. Id. at 255.
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fendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.13 According to a majority of
the court of criminal appeals, the Act's problem stems from its focus on
speeding the prosecutor's preparation for trial and not on speeding the com-
mencement of trial.' 4 The Act gives no consideration to any of the tradi-
tional factors that courts examine to determine whether or not a defendant
has been denied a constitutional right to a speedy trial.m5 According to the
court the Speedy Trial Act deprives prosecutors of their exclusive discretion
in preparing for trial without directly protecting a defendant's constitutional
right to a speedy trial. 16 The court concluded that because the Texas Consti-
tution has no provision expressly granting the legislature the power to con-
trol a prosecutor's preparation for trial, the Speedy Trial Act violates the
separation of powers doctrine and is unconstitutional.' 7
The majority opinion of the court of criminal appeals fails to explain how
the Speedy Trial Act interferes with the discretion of prosecuting attorneys
to represent the state in court on criminal cases. As the dissenters point out,
the Speedy Trial Act does not require prosecutors to do anything.18 They
are free to pursue criminals aggressively or to do nothing, as they see fit.
The Act merely imposes certain sanctions on prosecutors if they fail to pre-
pare for trial once the Speedy Trial Act has been triggered.' 9
Even if it could be said that the Speedy Trial Act interfered with prosecu-
tors' discretion by directing them to prepare for trial when they would not
have otherwise prepared, such a requirement is clearly related to defendants'
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Obvious to all, except perhaps five
members of the court of criminal appeals, is that if the Act forces prosecu-
tors to be ready for trial in a timely fashion, then defendants will more likely
be afforded their constitutional right to a speedy trial. In that sense the
Speedy Trial Act does help protect a defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial.
The 1987 Texas Legislature amended the Speedy Trial Act without ad-
dressing the issues raised by the court of criminal appeals. 20
The legislature increased the time allotted for trial to commence in felony
cases from 120 days to 180 days.2 ' The amendments also provided that de-
lay caused by exceptional circumstances not under the control of the state's
attorney, such as scientific analysis should be excluded in computing the
time for trial to commence.22 Those amendments are, presumptively,
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 256. The court stated that the traditional factors used by courts in analyzing a
constitutional violation of the right to a speedy trial include: the length of the delay before
trial; the reason for the delay; the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and any
prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay in the trial. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972)).
16. 739 S.W.2d at 256.
17. Id. at 257.
18. Id. at 267 (Teague, J., dissenting), 270 (Miller, J., dissenting).
19. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.061 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1988).
20. Id. art. 32A.02.
21. Id. art. 32A.02, § 1(1).




The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the
similar issue of prosecutorial preparation and diligence under the federal
Speedy Trial Act.23 In United States v. Bigeler24 the court clearly stated
that the government has the duty to act promptly to secure the presence for
trial of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction and to seek timely
appointment of counsel for that prisoner.25 Under the federal act counsel
must be appointed in time to allow thirty days to prepare for trial within the
seventy-day time period within which the federal Speedy Trial Act requires a
trial to commence. 26 Failure to comply with the act's provisions, however,
does not require the indictment against an accused to be dismissed with prej-
udice.27 Unlike the Texas Speedy Trial Act, the federal Speedy Trial Act
allows an indictment to be dismissed without prejudice. 28 The government
can obtain a new indictment if it can show that the circumstances that led to
the violation of the Speedy Trial Act's requirements and the impact of rep-
rosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act and on the attain-
ment of justice would not offend notions of fair play. 29 The dismissal of an
indictment without prejudice under the federal Speedy Trial Act tolls the
running of the act's time limits. 30 The time limits begin to run anew with
the return of a new indictment.31
II. FORMER JEOPARDY
The courts heard a number of important double jeopardy cases during the
Survey period. The Dallas court of appeals decided the most alarming case,
Harrison v. State.32 The case concerned the state's prosecution of the de-
fendant, Harrison, for hindering apprehension. During Harrison's first trial
his defense attorney challenged the arresting officer's credibility by implying
that the officer did not really suffer a black eye in arresting the defendant or
the attorney would have noticed the black eye at the jail. Following the
officer's testimony, the trial court declared a mistrial on motion of the state
because the attorney had made himself a potential witness in the case. Prior
to his second trial, Harrison's special plea in bar was overruled. The Dallas
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a manifest
necessity for the mistrial existed and thus presented no double jeopardy bar
to retrying the defendant. 33 The court of appeals stated that an attorney
cannot serve as counsel and as an unsworn witness.34 The court relied on
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982).
24. 810 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1987).
25. Id. at 1323.
26. Id. at 1322 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b)-3161(c) (1982)).
27. Id. at 1323.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1982).
29. Bigler, 10 F.2d at 1324.
30. United States v. Hutchins, 818 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1987).
31. Id.
32. 721 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-Dallas, pet. granted).




the state bar disciplinary rules that require an attorney to withdraw from
representing a client if he becomes a potential witness in a case. 35
Harrison failed to reconcile the state bar disciplinary rules with an attor-
ney's obligation to investigate the facts of a case and a defendant's right to
effective assistance of counsel. If the court of criminal appeals upholds the
decision in Harrison, an attorney who interviews a witness who later testifies
differently at trial would become a potential witness and thus be disqualified
from representing his client. The client would then be deprived of the effec-
tive counsel of his choice. Such a result, particularly on the motion of the
prosecutor, is unconscionable without a showing that the defendant desired
the attorney actually to take the stand and testify in the case.
The court of criminal appeals dealt with a wide variety of double jeopardy
issues. Among them was Fulmer v. State,36 in which the court held that an
acquittal based on an indictment that alleged the wrong name for the com-
plainant did not bar prosecution under another indictment that correctly set
out the complainant's name.37 The court also continued its trend of consid-
ering erroneously admitted evidence in weighing the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to sustain a conviction. 38
In May v. State39 the court of criminal appeals clearly stated that the
Blockburger test4° is not the only test for determining if two offenses are the
same for double jeopardy purposes.41 In the defendant's first trial, the jury
found the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter arising out of an
automobile accident. Subsequently, the defendant brought a pretrial habeas
proceeding seeking dismissal of a driving while intoxicated prosecution aris-
ing out of same incident.
The court of criminal appeals relied on Illinois v. Vitale,42 in which the
United States Supreme Court discussed the possibility that two separate of-
fenses might still be the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy if the
prosecution of the second offense required relitigation of factual issues previ-
35. Id. at 907-08; SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, RULES GOVERNING THE STATE BAR OF
TEXAS art. XII, § 8 (Code of Professional Responsibility) DR 5-102(A) (1973). Disciplinary
Rule 5-102(A) states:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a law-
yer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a
witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial
and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he
may continue the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the
circumstances enumerated in DR5-101(B)(1) through (4).
36. 731 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
37. Id. at 946.
38. Messer v. State, 729 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (failure of trial court to
approve defendant's waiver of rights and agreement to stipulate is trial error but does not
render evidence insufficient to support guilty plea; no double jeopardy bar to retrial exists);
Faulder v. State, No. 69,077 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1987) (sufficiency of evidence is judged
by considering all evidence, including erroneously admitted confession).
39. 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
40. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1930) (two offenses are different for
double jeopardy purposes if each requires proof of an element that the other does not).
41. 726 S.W.2d at 577.
42. 447 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1980).
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ously determined by the first prosecution. 43 The Supreme Court found such
a result possible even if one of the two offenses required proof of an element
not contained in the other and thus the offenses were classified as different
offenses under the Blockburger test." In May the court of criminal appeals
held that since the state would seek to prove in the driving while intoxicated
case the same act of driving while intoxicated on a public roadway that it
proved in the involuntary manslaughter prosecution, the two offenses were
the same for double jeopardy purposes, thus barring the second
prosecution. 45
The court of criminal appeals also considered the doctrine of collateral
estoppel during the Survey period. In Ex parte Traver46 the court held that
a factual finding adverse to the state on a motion to revoke a defendant's
probation could not be relitigated in a criminal prosecution for the same act
(assault) that served as the basis of the motion to revoke probation.47 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, refused to
follow the reasoning of Traver in Showery v. Samaniego.48 In Showery the
defendant was free on an appeal bond for a murder conviction when he was
arrested for a new offense. The state sought revocation of the appeal bond
based on the fact that the defendant had committed a new offense. The trial
court revoked the bond, but the appellate court reversed the decision be-
cause the state had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant had committed a new offense.49 The Fifth Circuit refused to
block the new prosecution on double jeopardy or collateral estoppel grounds
because a bond revocation proceeding is not designed to obtain a conviction
for a new offense and thus is not essentially criminal in nature. 50
III. CHARGING INSTRUMENTS
In Labelle v. State 5 1 the court of criminal appeals extended the holding of
Adams v. State52 to motions to revoke probation. The state in Labelle
moved to revoke the defendant's probation, alleging that he had removed
and destroyed a governmental record. The defendant filed a motion to
quash the revocation motion, requesting that the state be required to specify




45. 726 S.W.2d at 576-77.
46. 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
47. Id. at 200. The state sought to prosecute the defendant for the same assault that the
district court dismissed as incredible after a full hearing on the state's motion to revoke proba-
tion. The state was to present the same case in the assault trial as it presented in the probation
hearing. Id at 196.
48. 814 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 202.
50. Id. at 203.
51. 720 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
52. 707 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (if trial court errs in overruling a motion
to quash an indictment or information, the conviction will not be reversed unless the error
prejudiced the defendant's ability to prepare a defense).
1988]
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In analyzing the motion to quash in Labelle, the court of criminal appeals
first determined that the trial court erred in overruling the motion because
the reference to "a governmental record" in the motion to revoke probation
was such an inadequate description as to be no description at all.53 The
court then applied the test of Adams v. State54 to determine whether revers-
ible error existed in Labelle.5s Because the record showed that the state had
informed the defendant of the identity of the governmental record prior to
the hearing, and because the defendant failed to produce any witnesses or
evidence in his behalf or argue that the alleged act had not occurred, the
court found no impact on the defendant's ability to prepare his defense.
5 6
The court of criminal appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 57
In an important decision for cases brought prior to December 1, 1985, the
court of criminal appeals held in Janecka v. State58 that the state may
amend an indictment to correct defects in form pointed out by a motion to
quash. 59
In Gonzales v. State6° the state alleged in the indictment that the defend-
ant started a fire in San Antonio, but failed to allege that San Antonio was
an incorporated city or town.6 1 The court of criminal appeals held that
whether San Antonio is an incorporated city is a fact of which judicial notice
is taken. 62 As such, the fact need not be alleged in an indictment.
6 3
IV. JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
The 1987 Texas Legislature broadened the definition of "criminal epi-
sode" in the Penal Code. 64 Now a defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all offenses arising out of the same "criminal episode"
regardless of whether those offenses are found in title 7 of the Penal Code.
6 5
53. 720 S.W.2d at 106.
54. 707 S.W.2d at 903.
55. Labelle, 720 S.W.2d at 106.
56. Id. at 109.
57. Id.
58. No. 68,881 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 7, 1987).
59. Id., slip op. at 7 (overruling Brusfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980)); cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon Pare. Supp. 1988).
60. 723 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
61. It is an offense to start a fire in an incorporated city or town. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 28.02(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
62. 723 S.W.2d at 751.
63. Id. at 752. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.18 (Vernon 1966) states that mat-
ters of which judicial notice is taken need not be stated in an indictment.
64. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988) reads as follows:
In this chapter, "criminal episode" means the commission of two or more of-
fenses, regardless of whether the harm is directed toward or inflicted upon more
than one person or item of property, under the following circumstances:
(1) the offenses are committed pursuant to the same transaction or pursuant
to two or more transactions that are connected or constitute a common scheme
or plan; or
(2) the offenses are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses.
65. Id. § 3.02 (Vernon 1974); see also former TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon
1974) (criminal episode is restricted to the repeated commission of any one offense found in
title 7 of the Penal Code).
[Vol. 42
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This new definition of "criminal episode" allows the joinder of all offenses
arising out of the same transaction and also allows the joinder of the re-
peated commission of similar offenses. 66 A defendant prosecuted under
these new joinder provisions can be convicted and sentenced for more than
one offense arising out of the same transaction. 67
During the Survey period the Fifth Circuit reiterated its general rule that
persons who are indicted together should be tried together. 68 Few excep-
tions to this rule exist. Even a situation such as United States v. Carrion,69 in
which one defendant in a joint prosecution intended to raise an entrapment
defense and the other defendant planned to argue insufficiency of the evi-
dence, did not justify a severance. 70 In order to obtain a severance because
of incompatible defenses, a defendant must show that the defenses are irrec-
oncilable and that the jury would draw adverse inferences from the conflict
itself.7 1 In the Fifth Circuit this requirement places an almost impossible
burden on the defendant.
V. GRAND JURY
The First District Court of Appeals in Houston in Alejandro v. State72
considered the question of whether previously suppressed evidence can be
the basis for a reindictment. The grand jury indicted the appellant for the
offense of possession of heroin with intent to deliver. Following that indict-
ment the trial court heard and granted the appellant's motion to suppress
evidence. The state then submitted evidence of the same offense to another
grand jury, which again indicted the appellant. The court of appeals, in this
case of first impression in Texas, held that the grand jury could consider the
suppressed evidence.73 Presumably, however, the collateral estoppel doc-
trine will prevent the state from using the suppressed evidence in the new
prosecution.
During the survey period the court of criminal appeals reexamined the
procedure for holding a person in contempt for refusing to answer questions
before a grand jury when the person has been granted immunity.7 4 In such a
case, the prosecutor must file a motion for contempt with the district court
66. See supra note 64.
67. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03 (Vernon 1974); cf. Billings v. State, 725 S.W.2d 757,
760 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th] 1987, no pet.) (securing multiple convictions on offenses
joined for prosecution that arise out of one transaction is improper).
68. United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1084 (5th Cir. 1987).
69. 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987).
70. Id. at 1125-26.
71. United States v. Wheeler, 802 F.2d 778, 782 (5th Cir. 1986) (severance not prejudicial
where ringleader's testimony negatively impacted accomplice's credibility); United States v.
Stotts, 792 F.2d 1318, 1321-22 (5th Cir. 1986) (defenses not incompatible where all defendants
argued unawareness of conspiracy); United States v. Nichols, 695 F.2d 86, 92-93 (5th Cir.
1981) (defenses not irreconcilable when one defendant argued that he was innocent of conspir-
acy and other defendant argued legitimacy of scheme).
72. Alejandro v. State, 725 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1987, no pet.).
73. Id at 513. The court also found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct.
74. Exparte Port, 674 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (overruling Exparte Port, 674,
S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), holding that refusal to answer grand jury questions con-
stituted contempt of grand jury).
1988]
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that impanelled the grand jury and ask that the witness be ordered to answer
the grand jury's questions.75 If the court orders the witness to answer the
questions and the witness still refuses to answer, he may be found in con-
tempt of the district court's order. 76 The mere refusal by a witness to answer
questions before the grand jury is not contempt. 77 The grand jury must seek
help from the court in dealing with a recalcitrant witness because a grand
jury has no inherent power to punish a witness for contempt. 78
VI. VENUE
The court of criminal appeals decided only two cases of note concerning
the issue of change of venue this Survey period. In Aranda v. State79 the
court upheld a change of venue on the trial court's own motion and over the
appellant's objection. 80 The court rejected the appellant's argument that he
should have the prerogative to be tried in the county where the offense oc-
curred unless the evidence is overwhelming that both the state and the de-
fendant will not receive a fair trial in that county.81
In Faulder v. State 82 the court of criminal appeals reviewed the denial of a
change of venue motion even though the motion was not sworn to or accom-
panied by two affidavits as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure. 83
The court held that because a motion for change of venue is of constitutional
dimensions, strict compliance with the requirements of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is not necessary.84 The court then affirmed the trial court's denial
of the motion, stating that the fact that a case has been publicized, without
more, does not establish prejudice or require a change of venue.85
VII. BAIL
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Salerno,86 considered the provi-
sions of the Bail Reform Act8 7 that allow a federal court to detain an arres-
tee without bail pending trial. Salerno was an alleged "boss" of the
Genovese Crime Family. He was arrested and charged with numerous vio-
lations of federal law. The trial court detained Salerno in custody, without
bail, because no release conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the
community.
75. Id. at 447.
76. Id. at 449.
77. Id. at 448.
78. Id. at 44849.
79. 736 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
80. Id. at 706 (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.01 (Vernon 1966) allows trial court
to change venue on its own motion after giving notice to accused and state and hearing evi-
dence thereon).
81. Id. at 705.
82. No. 69,077 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1987) (not yet reported).
83. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (requires a defendant's
motion for change of venue to be sworn and supported by two affidavits).
84. No. 69,077, slip op. at 20.
85. Id. at 21.
86. 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987).
87. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
[Vol. 42
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Salerno challenged his detention on the grounds that it violated the fifth 88
and eighth8 9 amendments to the United States Constitution in that his de-
tention constituted punishment before trial and a denial of his right to bail.
The Supreme Court held, however, that the Bail Reform Act is regulatory
and not penal.90 The Court stated that the government's interest in commu-
nity safety can outweigh an individual's liberty interest.9 1 Thus, when an
accused presents an identifiable and articulable threat to an individual or
society, he may, consistent with due process, be detained without bail.92 The
court further held that when some interest other than the prevention of flight
mandates detention, the eighth amendment does not require release on
bail.93
The dissent argued that the Bail Reform Act turns an untried indictment
into evidence favoring pretrial detention and thus contradicts the presump-
tion of innocence. 94 According to the dissent, crime prevention should not
be considered as a factor in setting bail.95 The focus of the Bail Reform Act,
according to the dissent, should be on imposing conditions of release to in-
sure the defendant's appearance at the trial on the charges relating to the
defendant's arrest. 96 The dissent raised the question of whether the govern-
ment can continue to hold a defendant after acquittal if the defendant is still
dangerous to the community. 97 A majority of the Supreme Court seems on
the brink of sanctioning such preventive detention.
VIII. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In Arnold v. State98 the court of criminal appeals established the standard
for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's verdict find-
ing the defendant competent.99 An examination of the evidence supporting
such a verdict begins with a presumption of competency.10°  The defendant
must thus prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 In
Arnold the court held that a jury finding of competency must be examined in
the light most favorable to that verdict. 10 2 The standard of review is
whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed
to prove his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.' 0 3 Under
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process).
89. Id. amend. VII (excessive bail clause).
90. 107 S. Ct. at 2102, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 708-09.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2103, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 711.
93. Id. at 2105, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 713-14.
94. Id. at 2110-11, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 719 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2111, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 720.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2110, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 719.
98. 719 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
99. Id. at 592.
100. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § l(b) (Vernon 1979).
101. Id.
102. 719 S.W.2d at 593.
103. Id. Contra Hill v. State, 721 S.W.2d 953, 954-56 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no pet.)




Arnold the appellate courts may not reweigh or reclassify the evidence in
competency trials. 104
During the Survey period the court of criminal appeals again addressed
the issue of incompetency in Manning v. State.'0 5 The court held that if a
defendant introduces evidence of a prior, unvacated adjudication of incom-
petency, the state must then prove the defendant's competency beyond a
reasonable doubt.10 6 The presumption that a defendant is competent to
stand trial does not apply in such a situation.107
Barber v. State' 08 established the rule that a trial court must impanel a
jury to decide the issue of competency when some evidence of incompetency,
amounting to more than a scintilla, is brought to the attention of the judge
even during trial on the merits. 109 The trial judge does not weigh the evi-
dence on competency. Instead, the judge must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party with the burden of supporting the finding, disre-
garding contrary evidence and inferences. 01
IX. CONTINUANCE
Legislative continuances"' came under the scrutiny of the court of crimi-
nal appeals in Collier v. Poe. 1 2 In that case the grand jury indicted the
defendant, Collier, for the offenses of attempted murder and aggravated as-
sault. Collier hired an attorney to represent him and his cases were subse-
quently set for trial. Later, more than ten days in advance of the trial
setting, Collier retained State Representative Debra Danburg to assist in his
defense. Representative Danburg promptly filed a motion for a legislative
continuance. The trial court overruled the motion for continuance, even
though the state did not file a controverting motion demonstrating that the
state would suffer irreparable harm or that substantial existing rights of the
state would be defeated by delaying the trial. The court of criminal appeals
held that when the statute governing legislative continuances is complied
with and the statutory exception" 13 does not apply, then the trial court has
no discretion except to grant the motion." 4
X. DISCOVERY
Aggravated sexual assault cases raised some interesting discovery issues
during the Survey period. In State ex rel. Wade v. Stephens " 5 the trial court
104. 719 S.W.2d at 593; see also Hill, 721 S.W.2d at 954-55.
105. 730 S.W.2d 744, 745-46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
106. Id. at 748.
107. Id. at 748 n.3.
108. 737 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
109. Id. at 828.
110. Id.
111. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 30.00 (Vernon 1986).
112. 732 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Crim. App.); cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 51, 98 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1987).
113. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 30.003(c) (Vernon 1986) does not permit a legisla-
tive continuance if counsel is retained within ten days if the scheduled trial date.
114. Id. at 346.
115. 724 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.).
[Vol. 42
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ordered the complainant in an aggravated sexual assault prosecution to sub-
mit to a physical examination. The state sought a writ of mandamus in the
Dallas court of appeals to nullify that order. The appellate court held that
the trial court had no authority to order the complainant to submit to a
physical examination and ordered the trial court to set aside its order. 116
The court reasoned that no general right to discovery exists under the
United States or Texas Constitutions.11 7 The court also stated that rule 167a
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,"" which allows civil litigants to be
ordered to submit to physical examinations, does not apply to criminal
cases. 11 9 Further, the court held that article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure120 does not authorize trial courts to order witnesses to submit to
physical examinations. 121 Moreover, trial courts have no inherent authority
to order this type of discovery. 122
In another aggravated sexual assault case, Dickens v. Court of Appeals,123
the trial judge sought a writ of mandamus from the court of criminal appeals
contesting the issuance by the court of appeals of a writ of mandamus di-
recting the trial judge to allow discovery of a complainant's videotaped state-
ment. In reviewing the situation the court of criminal appeals stated that a
defendant has a limited right to discovery of exculpatory or mitigating evi-
dence. 124 A defendant does not have a general right to discovery. 125 The
trial judge was within his discretion to deny the defendant's request for a
copy of the videotape. 126
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 127 the United States Supreme Court held that a
defendant's rights of confrontation and compulsory process do not carry
with them the power to compel pretrial disclosure of the names of the state's
witnesses or information that would be useful in cross-examining the state's
witnesses.1 28 The Court adopted a due process analysis under the fourteenth
amendment for the review of pretrial discovery rather than an examination
under the less settled confines of the sixth amendment. 129
116. Id. at 144-45.
117. Id. at 143.
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(a) states:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party,
or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in contro-
versy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to
a physical or mental examination by a physician or to produce for examination
the person in his custody or legal control. The order may be made only on
motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and
to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of
the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
119. Stephens, 724 S.W.2d at 143-44.
120. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (Vernon 1979).
121. 724 S.W.2d at 144.
122. Id.
123. 727 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
124. Id. at 551.
125. Id.
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127. 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987).
128. Id. at 999, 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 54, 57.
129. Id. at 1001, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 57.
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